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THE SUPREME COURT, CIVIL RIGHTS
LITIGATION, AND DEJA VU'
Constance Baker Motleyt
INTRODUCTION
Since at least 1950, civil rights litigation has occupied much of
the time of the Supreme Court, as well as the lower federal courts,
as the drive for racial equality in the American community moved
forward. When the Supreme Court in 1950 ordered the admission
of a black law student in Texas to the all-white University of Texas
Law School, 2 civil rights lawyers knew that a new day had dawned
for black Americans. Soon thereafter, in the decade 1954 to 1964,
the Supreme Court, in an unprecedented series of civil rights cases,
declared unconstitutional all state statutes, policies, customs, us-
ages, and city ordinances requiring or sanctioning racial segregation
in the public life of the American community.
When the civil rights fight then turned to private racial discrimi-
nation which interfered with the liberty of black and white Ameri-
cans in the public domain, clear-cut Supreme Court victories for
civil rights litigators became more difficult. However, the grass-
roots revolution sparked by the High Court's decisions caused the
Congress, beginning in 1964, to rewrite and strengthen civil rights
laws. These laws had been enacted by the Reconstruction Congress
in the last century to guarantee equality for black Americans after
the Civil War. Since 1964, interpretation of the newly enacted civil
rights laws has increasingly occupied the Supreme Court's time.
Recently, much to the dismay of the civil rights community, the
Court's new majority has evidenced a growing weariness with "the
race issue." This discernible weariness parallels the turn of events
in the last century after years of struggle for freedom and equality in
the new American community following the abolition of slavery and
the end of the Civil War.
When the Supreme Court's majority in 1896 bestowed its bless-
ing on the Southerners' argument that the Constitution's guarantee
I This Article was originally delivered as a lecture in the Robert S. Stevens lecture
series at Cornell University in November, 1989 and has been adapted for publication.
t The Honorable Constance Baker Motley is a Senior Judge in the Southern Dis-
trict of New York. B.A., New York University;J.D., Columbia University School of Law.
2 Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950).
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of equality for blacks was not violated by providing them with "sepa-
rate but equal" public facilities and services,3 it was as much an ex-
pression of a nationwide weariness with the decades old race
struggle as it was legal machinations to obscure this fact. Now, after
forty years of civil rights litigation, a weariness has again begun to
pall on the land and the High Court's new majority appears to be
struggling to cover this reality.
THE EBB AND THE FLOW
During the last century, civil rights advocates merged with
Abolitionists in the effort to abolish slavery. Although the anti-
slavery movement had started at least as early as the eighteenth
century, it was not really successful until the thirteenth amendment
to the Constitution in 1865. Thereafter, it became dear that the
national charter would have to be amended yet again to ensure that
the newly freed slaves (as well as those who had been earlier freed)
would have meaningful freedom. This need was particularly
pressing in the South where state action was being used to maintain
African-Americans in a second-class position in society. The
constitutional lawyers of that day realized that another amendment
to the Constitution, the basic law of the land, was required to
address the problem of state-enforced racial discrimination and
segregation. These lawyers proposed such an amendment and,
together with the civil rights advocates of that day, succeeded in
having the Constitution amended once again.
The fourteenth amendment of 1868 was designed to confer citi-
zenship status on African-Americans and to prevent the states from
depriving them of their rights as citizens. The amendment provided
that Congress should enact laws designed to enforce its purpose
and intent. The Reconstruction Congress did so by enacting a
number of laws, many of which are still on the books. The constitu-
tional lawyers who led the Congress during the Reconstruction era
were also convinced that if African-Americans were to enjoy equal
citizenship rights in the future, they would have to have political
clout guaranteed them by the basic law of the land. Toward this
end, the Congress proposed the adoption of the fifteenth amend-
ment to the Constitution, which protected former slaves' right to
vote and thus to participate in government in the same way as white
citizens. National leadership thus provided the necessary political
leverage for constitutional change.
Notwithstanding the three post-Civil War constitutional amend-
ments which were designed to bring the newly freed slaves into the
3 Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
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family of this Nation, and despite the Congress's efforts to enforce
the fourteenth amendment, the Supreme Court's Plessy decision in
1896 effectively nullified that amendment by permitting the South-
ern states to provide separate but equal public facilities. When the
student "sit-ins" began in 1960, this country learned that the
Supreme Court in 1883 had declared one of Congress's most im-
portant enactments to enforce the fourteenth amendment unconsti-
tutional-that was the Civil Rights Act of 1875, which sought to
guarantee former slaves equal treatment in privately owned places
of public accommodation.
Following the Supreme Court's decisions in 1883 and 1896, the
dawn of the twentieth century found former slaves effectively
stripped of their citizenship rights. This nullification was also ac-
complished by laws enacted by the Southern states designed to seg-
regate former slaves from the cradle to the grave. As a result, the
United States entered World War I with white soldiers and black
soldiers in separate units, despite our proclamations to other na-
tions that we were making the world safe for democracy.
When World War II broke out, African-Americans had been
emancipated for almost three-quarters of a century. Many former
slaves and their descendants had migrated from the South to north-
ern industrial centers like New York, Chicago, and Philadelphia. As
a consequence, what was once largely a southern problem arising
from slavery and emancipation became a national problem with seg-
regated housing, schools, and other facilities in northern urban cen-
ters. Nothing significant had been done about the problem of racial
segregation on a national level in this century until it became appar-
ent that our effort to win World War II would require the utilization
of African-Americans in the armed forces and defense industries.
President Roosevelt issued Executive Order 8803 so that blacks
would be hired in defense plants. Roosevelt, however, did not abol-
ish segregation in the armed forces. Most Americans have already
forgotten, if they were alive at that time, the real societal stress
which World War II placed upon this Nation's physical, psychologi-
cal, and work force resources. One area of deep-seated anxiety was
the fact that racial segregation was pervasive; indeed, segregation in
the armed forces was the foremost symbol of our home-grown ra-
cism. It proved impossible for this country to escape the national
and international embarrassment which flowed from the fact that
African-American citizens were being asked to go abroad to die for
this Country when at home they were still wearing the badges of
their former servitude.
Segregation in the armed forces subjected black servicemen to
a particularly galling humiliation which, when combined with the
1991] 645
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knowledge that they were being asked to die for their racist country,
gave them new insight into their status as American citizens. This
provided the basis for an emergent militancy on the part of African-
Americans, evidenced by the fact that African-American servicemen
enrolled in the NAACP in unprecedented numbers during World
War II. The new militancy planted the seeds of grassroots support
for the civil rights revolution which was to come.
President Truman eventually abolished segregation in the
armed forces in 1948 as a direct result of the efforts of the NAACP,
thus striking the first major, national-level blow to segregation in
American society. The next such blow came from the Supreme
Court in 1954 when it declared segregation in the public schools
unconstitutional. 4 In the decade which followed, the Supreme
Court ruled unconstitutional segregation in all other public facilities
and services, including segregation in Southern courthouses. 5 This
was accompanied by the enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,6
another congressional attempt to enforce the fourteenth amend-
ment. This attempt was successful; legal segregation was dead by
1964.
Many of the Burger Court's decisions approved potent weapons
for federal judges, civil rights attorneys, and the government to
combat racial and other forms of segregation. This arsenal included
the bussing of school children,7 disparate impact suits under Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act,8 the use of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 to challenge
race discrimination by private parties,9 certain types of race-
conscious methods such as contract set-asides (at least when man-
dated by Congress), 1° and voluntary affirmative action by public1
and private' 2 parties to remedy past discrimination. The Burger
Court also decided that governmental distinctions based on gender
required heightened scrutiny under the equal protection clause of
the fourteenth amendment.' 3 Further, the Burger Court held (as I
had argued before it years earlier) that a defendant in a criminal
4 Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
5 Watson v. City of Memphis, 373 U.S. 526 (1963) (public parks); Johnson v. Vir-
ginia, 373 U.S. 61 (1963) (courthouses); Holmes v. City of Atlanta, 223 F.2d 93 (5th
Cir.), vacated, 350 U.S. 879 (1955) (public golf courses); Dawson v. City of Baltimore,
220 F.2d 386 (4th Cir.), aff'd, 350 U.S. 877 (1955) (public beaches).
6 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1975a-1975d, 2000a-2000h-6 (1988).
7 Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
8 E.g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
9 Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976).
10 Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980).
11 E.g., Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
12 E.g., Local 28, Sheet Metal Workers v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 421 (1986); United Steel-
workers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979).
13 See, e.g., Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
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proceeding could attack the use of peremptory challenges by the
prosecution to exclude members of the defendant's racial group
from the petit jury.' 4
During the Burger Court years, Congress extended the cover-
age of Title VII to public employees.' 5 It enacted Tide IX of the
Education Amendments of 1972,16 the Rehabilitation Act of 1973,17
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1978,18 and the Preg-
nancy Discrimination Act of 1978.' 9 It extended the provisions of
the Voting Rights Act.20 And in 1987, Congress overruled the
Court's decision in Grove City College v. Bell,2' thereby giving a broad
reach to federal statutes which prohibit discrimination by recipients
of federal funds. 22
At the same time, the Burger Court also set limits on relief for
civil rights claimants under the equal protection clause. In a series
of cases involving school desegregation,23 public employment prac-
tices, 24 and housing practices, 25 the Court clarified that it would rec-
ognize only claims of intentional (i.e., de jure and not de facto)
discrimination under the Constitution.
It also found that the Constitution prohibited certain kinds of
remedial actions by government agents. In what is probably the
most famous civil rights decision of the Burger Court, Regents of the
University of California v. Bakke,2 6 the Court found that an affirmative
action admissions policy that reserved a certain number of places to
nonwhites in a state-supported medical school illegally discrimi-
nated against a white applicant.2 7 Although the Court approved the
use of race-conscious admissions methods as long as they reserved
some sort of individual consideration for all otherwise qualified ap-
plicants,28 the Court has since extended the use of the equal protec-
14 Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965); later rev'd, Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S.
79 (1986).
15 Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17
(1988).
16 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1688 (1988).
17 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-796i (1988).
18 Id §§ 621-634.
19 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1988).
20 Id § 1973.
21 465 U.S. 555, 573 (1984) (receipt of federal aid by college students does not
trigger institution-wide coverage under Title IX).
22 20 U.S.C. § 1687 (1988).
23 Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974); Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S.
189 (1973).
24 Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
25 Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252
(1977).
26 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
27 Id. at 271-72.
28 Id. at 316-17.
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tion clause to limit remedial governmental conduct in the context of
employment relations 29 and contracting.a
The first terms of the Rehnquist Court showed little change in
its ambivalence toward civil rights claimants. The Court approved
some voluntary remedial actions by private employers,3 ' and a fed-
eral court order requiring the temporary use of racial quotas to rem-
edy a long history of discriminatory conduct by a public employer.3 2
The Court also approved the use of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 to challenge
discrimination againstJews33 and Arabs,34 and the use of a disparate
impact theory under Title VII to challenge subjective decision-
making practices of an employer.3 5
The Rehnquist Court, however, showed early signs of hostility
to broad challenges to governmental conduct where an individual-
ized showing of discriminatory intent was lacking. In McCleskey v.
Kemp,3 6 the Court rejected a challenge to the Georgia death penalty
based on overwhelming statistical evidence that the killers of whites
were 4.3 times more likely to receive the death penalty than killers
of blacks.37 The evidence also showed that blacks who killed whites
were nearly three times more likely to be sentenced to death than
were whites who killed other whites.38 The Court nevertheless re-
jected the challenge, stating that McCleskey (a black defendant con-
victed of murdering a white and sentenced to death) had failed to
show that the decision of any juror in his case was racially moti-
vated.3 9 This is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to do. In
Bakke, Justice Powell had indicated that a concern for individual
treatment required the Court to protect individual whites from gov-
ernmental action designed to correct the effects of racism. 40 In Mc-
Cleskey, however, that concern for individual treatment became a
justification for rejecting challenges to governmental conduct per-
vaded by racism where the challenge lacked individualized forms of
evidence.41
In the Supreme Court's 1988-89 Term, one can see what is per-
29 Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267 (1986).
30 City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
31 Johnson v. Transportation Agency, Santa Clara County, Cal., 480 U.S. 616
(1987).
32 United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149 (1987).
33 Shaare Tefila Congregation v. Cobb, 481 U.S. 615 (1987).
34 Saint Francis College v. Al-Khazraji, 481 U.S. 604 (1987).
35 Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977 (1988).
36 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
37 Id. at 287.
38 Id.
39 Id. at 292-93.
40 Bakke, 438 U.S. at 290-91.
41 McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 297.
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haps only the beginning of a new effort by the Court to stem the tide
of civil rights litigation which has occupied so much of the federal
courts' time since 1950. A hostility toward challenges to systemic
inequality, together with a desire to protect "innocent" members of
dominant groups, pervaded the Court's decisions in that Term.
ANOTHER EBB?
In a series of civil rights decisions, beginning with the Richmond
case concerning municipal set-asides for minority contractors, 42 the
Court established new limits on remedial programs and on the use
of the most potent statutory weapons against discrimination. In one
Term, the Court subjected voluntary governmental efforts to re-
dress systemic racism to a far more restrictive standard of review
and increased the burdens of proof of past racism.43 It severely lim-
ited the ability of Title VII claimants to challenge employment prac-
tices by showing discriminatory effect.44 While expanding the
opportunity for non-parties to bring reverse discrimination chal-
lenges against affirmative action schemes, 45 the Court limited the
time within which potential victims of certain types of discriminatory
practices may challenge those practices.46 And, finally, the Court
read the post-Civil War statutes narrowly so as to limit severely their
application to both private and public conduct.47 In short, the
Court's signals are no longer mixed.
To demonstrate the parallels between this century and the last,
I will examine more closely three decisions of the 1988-89 Term.
The Richmond case 48 gives some indication of the Court's current
understanding of the equal protection clause-specifically, the ex-
tent and ways it protects dominant groups (like whites) from volun-
tary remedial actions of local governments. The other two cases,
Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio49 and Patterson v. McLean Credit
Union,50 provide some indication of how the current majority in-
tends to treat congressional schemes designed to combat discrimi-
nation and the Court decisions interpreting them.
In Richmond, the Court struck down a plan adopted by the City
42 City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
43 See id.
44 Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 109 S. Ct. 2115 (1989).
45 Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755 (1989).
46 Lorance v. AT&T Technologies, 490 U.S. 900 (1989).
47 Jett v. Dallas Indep. School Dist., 109 S. Ct. 2702 (1989); Patterson v. McLean
Credit Union, 109 S. Ct. 2363 (1989); Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58
(1989).
48 City of Richmond v.J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
49 109 S. Ct. 2115 (1989).
50 109 S. Ct. 2363 (1989).
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of Richmond which required that contractors awarded city contracts
subcontract at least 30% of the dollar amount of each contract to
one or more "Minority Business Enterprises" ("MBE's").51 Under
the plan, the city could waive this requirement upon proof that suffi-
cient qualified MBE's were unavailable to participate.5 2 Although
the plan claimed to be "remedial," it was adopted after a public
hearing at which the majority of the city council found no direct
evidence that the city had discriminated on the basis of race in
awarding contracts, or that prime contractors had discriminated
against minority subcontractors. 53 However, the evidence that was
presented included the following: a study showing that while 50%
of the population of the city was black, only 0.67% of its prime con-
struction contracts had been awarded to minority businesses in re-
cent years; figures showing that many of the local contractors'
associations had virtually no MBE members; and testimony that
there had been widespread racial discrimination in the local, state,
and national construction industries.54
Writing for the Court, Justice O'Connor held that all racial clas-
sifications, even those considered "benign" or "remedial," should
be subjected to strict scrutiny, the most demanding scrutiny under
equal protection analysis. Significantly, the Court announced that
local governments did not have the same authority as Congress (act-
ing under section 5 of the fourteenth amendment) to use such reme-
dial methods. 55 The Court then held that a generalized claim of
past discrimination in the construction industry did not justify the
use of a racial quota, because such a claim provides no guidance or
limit on the appropriate scope or duration of the remedy.56 Against
this backdrop, the Court found that the city had failed to demon-
strate a compelling interest to justify the plan and that the plan was
not narrowly tailored to remedy the effects of past discrimination. 57
The inclusion of minority groups other than blacks, regardless of
their geographic location within the United States, was particularly
damning in the eyes of the Court.58 The Court found that the inclu-
sion of these groups undermined the claim that the plan was
designed to remedy the effects of past wrongs. 59
Justice Marshall, one of the leaders of the battle for desegrega-
51 Richmond, 488 U.S. at 477-78.
52 Id. at 478-79.
53 Id. at 480.
54 Id.
55 Id. at 504-05.
56 Id. at 505.
57 Id.




tion in the post-World War II era, wrote a strong dissent, which was
joined by Justices Brennan, Blackmun, and Stevens. Objecting to
the Court's application of strict scrutiny, Marshall attested to the
"profound difference" that "separates governmental actions that
themselves are racist, and governmental actions that seek to remedy
the effects of prior racism or to prevent neutral governmental activ-
ity from perpetuating the effects of such racism." 60 By failing to
make this distinction, Marshall charged, the majority "signals that it
regards racial discrimination as largely a phenomenon of the past,
and that government bodies need no longer preoccupy themselves
with rectifying racial injustice." 61 Marshall also took issue with the
Court's analysis of the evidence of discrimination on which the City
of Richmond based its decision to conduct its remedial program.
He expressed alarm that the "daunting standard" of proof placed
on states and localities by the Court would discourage the battle
against racial discrimination and its effects.6 2
In any event, it seems clear from the Richmond decision that the
conservative understanding of the equal protection clause as pro-
moting formalistic neutrality has found support in a solid majority
of the Court. The dissent's conception of equal protection as an
instrument to protect and advance the interests of those historically
victimized has suffered a serious attack.
The Wards Cove case involved a disparate impact challenge
under Tide VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to a set of employ-
ment practices by a private company that ran a canning operation in
Alaska.63 Disparate impact cases are those in which the plaintiff
does not allege discriminatory intent but instead claims that some
employment practice (such as requiring that all employees have a
high school diploma) has a disproportionately adverse effect on a
protected group (e.g., black job applicants). The theory behind dis-
parate impact cases is that apparently nondiscriminatory practices
can needlessly perpetuate past discrimination. If such a practice is
not necessary for business reasons, it should not be used.
The Court approved the use of disparate impact challenges
under Title VII in the 1971 case of Griggs v. Duke Power Co. 64 But the
Court has held that the Constitution alone, more specifically the
equal protection clause, requires a showing of discriminatory intent.
Disparate impact theories offer civil rights claimants a powerful tool
in the fight against discrimination in situations where the effect of
60 Id. at 551-52 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
61 Id. at 552.
62 Id. at 555.
63 Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 109 S. Ct. 2115 (1989).
64 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
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discrimination is persistent, yet discriminatory intent is lacking or
evidence of intent is difficult to uncover.
Although several legal issues were in dispute in Wards Cove, the
most prominent was the question of burdens of proof. Since the
Court first approved disparate impact challenges under Title VII in
Griggs, judges, lawyers, and federal agencies responsible for enforc-
ing Title VII commonly assumed that once a plaintiff established
that an employer was engaging in some practice with a disparate
impact on a protected group, the employer had the burden of prov-
ing that the practice was a "business necessity." The Court's deci-
sion in Wards Cove has turned this assumption on its head.65
In reviewing a disparate impact challenge to a canning opera-
tion in which virtually all of the "unskilled" cannery workers were
nonwhite and virtually all of the "skilled" non-cannery workers
where white, the Court, per Justice White, held that the burden re-
mained at all times with the plaintiff to show that the challenged
hiring practices were not justified by legitimate business interests. 66
Only the burden of coming forward with some evidence of business
justification (i.e., the burden of production) shifted to the employer
after the employee showed a disparate impact, but never the burden
of persuading that the challenged practice was justified.
In addition, the Court held that while "a mere insubstantial jus-
tification" would not be sufficient to relieve the employer of liability,
"there is no requirement that the challenged practice be 'essential'
or 'indispensable' to the employer's business for it to pass mus-
ter. '"67 The Court found that that "degree of scrutiny would be al-
most impossible for most employers to meet," and that it would
result in a "host of evils" (particularly employers using racial hiring
quotas) to avoid liability.68
Finally, the Court held that if the plaintiff cannot persuade the
trier of fact (in a Title VII case, the judge) that the employer's prac-
tices lacked business justification, the employee can still show that
alternative, nondiscriminatory practices are available. These prac-
tices, however, must be "equally effective" as the employer's chosen
method in achieving legitimate business goals, taking cost and other
burdens to the employer into account.69
In dissent, Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Brennan, Mar-
shall, and Blackmun, challenged the majority's understanding of
disparate impact suits. Stevens accused the majority of departing
65 Wards Cove, 109 S. Ct. at 2126.
66 Id.
67 Id. (citations omitted).
68 Id. (citations omitted).
69 Id. (citations omitted).
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from the body of law on disparate impact and "reformulating" the
burdens of proof.70 Calling this change in the law "unwise," Ste-
vens characterized the burden of showing business necessity as an
"affirmative defense. t71 Traditionally, the defendant has the bur-
den of proving such a defense. Justice Stevens also expressed
astonishment that the majority found no requirement that the chal-
lenged practice be "essential," calling that departure from tradi-
tional disparate impact analysis "most disturbing." 72
As the majority would have it, the Wards Cove decision broke no
new ground; it merely clarified various principles of Title VII law.
The civil rights community, however, saw the decision as an assault
on an established and powerful weapon against illicit discrimination
and its effects in the sphere of employment. The shift in burdens of
proof and the reduced scrutiny of employment practices, together
with other requirements and limitations on plaintiffs announced in
Wards Cove, make it much more difficult and costly for employees to
challenge practices based on their effect. Employees claiming dis-
crimination will now have to bear those burdens or undertake the
often more burdensome, if not impossible, task of proving discrimi-
natory intent.
The "evil" perceived by the majority of the Court in Wards Cove
was the undue burdening of those not found to have intentionally
discriminated. To prevent that evil, the Court chose to subject con-
duct perpetuating the effects of discrimination to reduced scrutiny.
In contrast, the dissenting Justices expressed concern that fair tools
in the fight against discrimination and its legacy had been needlessly
blunted.
The Patterson decision,73 written by Justice Kennedy, followed a
similar pattern. In that case, a black woman, Brenda Patterson,
brought suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, claiming that her employer
had subjected her to racial harassment.74 Section 1981, which
prohibits racial discrimination in the "making and enforcement of
contracts," was one of a series of measures enacted by the Recon-
struction Congress to combat racist restrictions on blacks in post-
Civil War society. In Patterson, the Court initially created a stir when
it sua sponte requested reargument on the question of whether sec-
tion 1981 reached private contractual (in this case, employment) re-
lations. The Court had decided that issue in Runyon v. McCrary
when it approved the use of section 1981 to challenge the exclusion
70 Id. at 2136 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
71 Id. at 2131 (citations omitted).
72 Id. at 2132.
73 Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 109 S. Ct. 2363 (1989).
74 Id- at 2368-69.
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of blacks from a private school. 75 In the end, the Court refrained
from overruling Runyon but instead read section 1981 narrowly, so
as to prevent its application to conduct following the formation of a
contract. 76 In Brenda Patterson's case, that meant that she could
not use section 1981 to challenge the racial harassment she endured
at the hands of her employer.77
Once again, the Court did not claim to be upsetting the expec-
tations of the legal community. Paying homage to stare decisis, the
Court indicated its reluctance to overrule statutory interpretations
where Congress has let them stand. It then found that a "sound
construction" of section 1981 yields an interpretation which does
not frustrate the objectives of Title VII.78 This construction, how-
ever, eviscerated section 1981.
What is particularly noteworthy about Patterson is the Court's
use of Title VII to limit the scope of section 1981. Rather than read-
ing both statutes as instruments created by Congress to fight dis-
crimination in different but complementary ways, the Court read the
administrative requirements of Title VII and the limits of the reme-
dies it offers as creating a special balance of interests which should
not be disturbed. The Court reasoned that the relief available
under section 1981 should be limited accordingly. 79 In reaching
this result, the majority ignored the problem raised by Justice Bren-
nan's dissent, that section 1981 is not limited to employment con-
tracts.80 The Court thus used Title VII to limit both the availability
of relief offered by section 198181 but not offered by Title VII in
employment discrimination suits, and access to other remedies in
areas where no other congressional scheme serves even plausibly as
a substitute.
The Patterson decision, like that in Wards Cove, reflects a strong
concern not to burden those accused of civil rights violations. To
avoid giving civil rights claimants overlapping tools to combat inten-
tional racial discrimination, the Court employed a strained, ahistori-
cal, and counter-intuitive reading of section 1981. In the same
month that the Court issued those two decisions, it issued several
others further limiting the ability of civil rights claimants to seek re-
lief under Title VII and the Reconstruction-era civil rights statutes.
It also expanded opportunities to bring reverse discrimination suits
75 427 U.S. 160 (1976).
76 Patterson, 109 S. Ct. at 2372.
77 Id. at 2373.
78 Id. at 2371.
79 Id. at 2374-75.
80 Id. at 2390.
81 Section 1981, in contrast to Title VII, offers remedial relief in the form of puni-
tive damages and compensatory damages beyond back pay.
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to challenge consent decrees entered long ago to settle discrimina-
tion claims. Although the Court in each of these cases modestly
claimed only to be following precedent, history, or the plain lan-
guage of the statutes before it, the Court succeeded in the course of
less than one month, in reshaping the civil rights landscape for
those already facing a steep incline in the road to fairness.
CONCLUSION
The Court's response in each of these civil rights cases reflects
a weariness in this country with civil rights issues that parallels that
of the last century. This weariness is perhaps best demonstrated in
its political context by the failure to mention civil rights, except in
fleeting terms, in recent State of the Union and Inaugural addresses.
When President Bush vetoed the Civil Rights Act of 199082 and the
Senate failed by one vote to override that veto, Congress's attempt
to remedy the Supreme Court's restrictive interpretations of prior
civil rights acts met with at least temporary defeat. It remains now
with Congress to determine if this Nation will have to litigate basic
issues of racial discrimination into the next century.
82 H.R. 4000, S. 2104, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., 136 CONG. REC. S1018 (daily ed. Feb.
7, 1990).
1991] 655
